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“Deliberate self-harm”— acts of self-poisoning (overdosing) or self-injury (e.g., cutting) 
that do not result in death — has historically provoked a moral judgment in those pro-
fessionals who treat it. Such judgments negatively value the act of self-harm and lead 
to the discriminatory treatment of self-harmers in accident and emergency departments 
and upon psychiatric wards. This article argues that the treatment of self-harmers in such 
environments has its origins in a “moral code” that negatively values the act of self-harm 
in comparison to (a) suicide, (b) the accident victim, and (c) individuals considered to 
be “genuinely” physically ill. The article fulfi lls two functions. First, it tracks the history 
of “medicine’s moral code” as it surrounds self-harm in the British context during the 
period 1950–2000. Then it turns to examine the ways in which patients groups — so-called 
psychiatric survivors — resisted such discriminatory treatment in the period 1988 –2000. 
Such resistance, the article concludes, creates the opportunity for a democratic dialogue 
to develop between patient groups and service providers that could potentially ameliorate 
the deleterious effects of medicine’s moral code. The article’s tone is polemical and is 
expressly written from a perspective sympathetic to the political claims of “survivors,” 
which the authors conclude forms a central component in the development of democratic 
practices within medicine and psychiatry.
Keywords:
“Self-harm”— or, as psychiatrists call it, “deliberate self-harm” (DSH) — has his-torically provoked a moral judgment in those professionals who “treat” it. It is as if acts of self-poisoning (overdosing) or self-injury (e.g., cutting) evoke a 
judgment from professionals that is different from other self-injurious acts such as smok-
ing or drinking. The fi rst question we wish to ask, then, in this article, is this: what is that 
judgment?
Comparisons are signifi cant here, for when, in 1988, Dr. Gillian Mezey, a psychiatrist 
at London’s Maudsley hospital, was interviewed by the Guardian about self-harm, she had 
this to say:
It [self-harm] makes staff feel uncomfortable. The controversy is whether or not you respond 
to their needs by giving them [self-harmers] what they want . . . it may encourage them to do it 
again. . . . Psychiatrists are not uncaring but they feel the same revulsion as anyone else and have 
the same diffi culties dealing with their feelings. (Hanson, 1988, p. 17, emphasis added)
[AuQ1]
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Surprisingly, Mezey describes her feelings as “revulsion,” which the dictionary defi nes as 
a “sudden violent change of feeling, a strong reaction.” Yet psychiatrists are, after all, 
medical people; they treat many examples of suffering during the course of their work, but 
they do not usually describe their reactions to these as “revulsion.” So, the second ques-
tion we want to ask concerns the meaning of Mezey’s “revulsion.” a meaning that, far from 
being unusual, is, she insists, “the same . . . as anyone else” (Hanson, 1988, p. 17, emphasis 
added).
To regard the act of self-harm with “revulsion” is a moral judgment. And this implies 
that, where self-harm is concerned, professionals respond with an attitude that may be 
understood by means of that well-known expression “weighing it up.” In other words, pro-
fessionals impose on self-harm a judgment of negative value; they “weigh it up” according 
to a moral scale and fi nd it “wanting.” This is why comparisons are signifi cant, for the 
professional attitude that negatively values self-harm is one that is largely absent with 
regard to smoking and drinking and wholly absent in, say, the accident and emergency 
department’s (A&E) reaction to the accident victim.
This article’s fi rst task is to show how such “strong reactions” and moral judgment com-
bine to produce, with regard to self-harm, what we call “medicine’s moral code.” Medicine’s 
moral code represents a complex of attitudes and practices in the context of which professionals 
“treat” self-harm. It is, as it were, the professional “ideology” that lies behind the treatment 
of self-harm and provides its justifi cation.
The article’s second task is to expose medicine’s moral code as a discriminatory code. 
Professionals’ treatment of self-harm discriminates against self-harmers, creating adverse 
effects in their lives. Self-harmers suffer not only through past traumas and the act of 
self-harm but also through direct contact with those service providers (A&E/psychiatry) 
that police the code. Such services categorize self-harmers, employing a discriminatory 
vocabulary (“attention seeking,” “manipulative,” “irresponsible,” and so on) that, as Judith 
Herman (1992) remarks, amounts to little more than a professional “insult” (p. 123).
The history of the code displays a division: it goes largely uncontested in the post–
World War II period in Britain, which closes by 1988. After that, it comes under increas-
ing attack. Specifi cally, it comes under attack from “psychiatric survivors” (i.e., groups 
of self-harmers themselves) who confront it with an alternative code of their own. This 
 alternative code has since become known, following survivors’ activism (see National 
Self-Harm Network [ NSHN ], 1998, 2000), as “harm minimization.”
The article’s tone is polemical and normative, by which we mean that it refers to 
medicine’s moral code in terms of self-harm as a discriminatory code in alliance with 
a perspective adopted by psychiatric survivors since the mid-1980s and expressed since 
that time in various forms (e.g., Pembroke, 1994; Shaw, 2005). In this respect, it con-
tinues the authors’ sociological work on psychiatric survivors in accordance with what 
has been previously called a “politico-ethical stance” (see Cresswell & Spandler, 2009, 
p. 143) — a stance that is politically engaged and works from within a survivor  perspective 
(see also Church, 1996).
MORAL VALUE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
A theoretical note before we proceed. This article often refers to the terms “moral” and 
“value” and to the latter as being either “positive” or “negative.” It is worth clarifying the 
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employment of these. “Moral” and “value” go together because in “weighing up” aspects 
of human behavior, we usually ascribe to them a “value,” not in the sense of a numerical 
value but in the sense that we consider behavior praiseworthy or blameworthy, we toler-
ate or we condemn it, or we even experience “revulsion.” When we consider behavior 
blameworthy or condemn it, we make a judgment of “negative value.” Indeed, we argue 
that such judgments and the practice of “discrimination” are tightly entwined. The cen-
tral argument advanced here is that this is the way that many professionals have regarded 
self-harm.
There is a signifi cant point to add, however. At the heart of our argument is the idea 
that we tend to morally value behavior in comparison with other specifi c behaviors. This is 
why we have been quick to state that “comparisons are signifi cant” and have compared 
self-harm already with other behaviors, such as smoking, drinking, and being an accident 
victim. In other words, when we say that self-harm is “negatively valued,” we mean that 
it is condemned in comparison with other behaviors, which are positively valued in comparison 
with self-harm.
Three such comparisons are thematic in this article: the comparisons of self-harm 
with (a) suicide, (b) the accident victim, and (c) the “genuinely” ill. Such comparisons, 
together with the moral values that surround them, have facilitated the formation of 
medicine’s moral code in the post–World War II period and have particular signifi cance 
in medical settings, especially, as this article shows, in the A&E department and the 
 psychiatric ward.
The article is divided into two parts. First, we chart the code’s formation from 1950 to 
1988, noting its expressions in medical, legal, and sociological fi elds. We then examine 
the ways in which “psychiatric survivors” have resisted the code, particularly the practice 
of “harm minimization.”
SELF-HARM AND MEDICINE’S MORAL CODE, 1950–1988
Although resistance to medicine’s moral code is confi ned to the activism of the “psy-
chiatric survivor” movement from the mid-1980s on, it is possible to detect criticisms 
of it prior to that. This section sketches three such manifestations, providing a context 
within which to understand both the code itself and the later activism of survivors. These 
 manifestations are the following:
1.  Psychiatric expertise, specifi cally the work of Erwin Stengel (1958, 1964) with Cook, the fi rst 
researcher to give sustained attention to self-harm without presuming that it was necessarily a 
suicidal act. The comparison between suicide and self-harm goes to the heart of the code.
2.  Statute law, especially debates surrounding the Suicide Act of 1961, which for the fi rst time 
in England and Wales decriminalized suicide and its “attempt.” The signifi cance of this is that 
self-harm became increasingly connected (post-1961) to the fi eld of medicine rather than to 
that of the law.
3.  Sociological research, particularly that of Roger Jeffery (1979), which foreshadowed argu-
ments against the code that psychiatric survivors later advance. These arguments extend the 
comparative analysis surrounding self-harming behaviors to include not suicide only but also 
(a) being an accident victim and (b) the perceptions of health care professionals about what 
it means to be “genuinely” ill.
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Erwin Stengel and the Distinction 
Between Self-Harm and Suicide
The psychiatrist Erwin Stengel conducted research into suicide and self-harm in the 
post–World War II period. He proceeded from a simple premise: while volumes of 
research existed on the subject of those who died from self-injurious acts (suicide), there 
was a dearth of research about those who had survived them. Today, the need for such 
research seems obvious, but in the 1950s Stengel’s was an original voice in advancing the 
following perspective: “It almost seems as if the essential difference between suicide and 
attempted suicide had been overlooked, i.e. that the person who has attempted suicide 
lives on . . . and that the attempt becomes a signifi cant event in his life” (Stengel & Cook, 
1958, p. 119).
To remedy this situation, Stengel did, in fact, research nonfatal self-harm, and he 
did so by employing the simple method of identifying admissions to hospital of indi-
viduals following episodes of self-harm and then interviewing them afterward.  Stengel’s 
fi ndings shed light on the code in the following ways. Although a small proportion of 
self-harmers did indeed go onto commit suicide, the majority did not. Self-harmers, 
Stengel concluded, should be regarded as a distinct “population” from suicides. From 
this, it followed that in the majority of cases of self-harm, death was not the intention. 
Obviously, these points combined pose this question: what was the intention? Stengel’s 
view was clear: in the absence of a death-directed intention, the act of self-harm should 
be understood as a “social behavior pattern” (Stengel & Cook, 1958, pp. 114–121). 
It displayed what he termed an “appeal function” that could not be understood with-
out reference to the “social fi eld” within which self-harm occurred. This social fi eld 
included friends and family but also, signifi cantly, the “hospital environment” (see also 
 Farberow &  Schneidman, 1961).
Stengel’s point was to differentiate self-harm from suicide by noting that not only 
is its motivation not death but is, in fact, its opposite: “survival appears at least as . . . 
legitimate an outcome as death, and it becomes clear that it is erroneous to divide sui-
cidal acts . . . death being the only criterion of success” (Stengel & Cook, 1958, p. 115, 
emphasis added).
Stengel was fully aware that his “discovery” — the distinction of self-harm and suicide — 
was not the accepted view. Indeed, his achievement was to expose the fact that in both 
the public and the professional perception, a moral judgment surrounded self-harm. What 
characterized this judgment was that it perceived self-harm in comparison with suicide only 
and had yet to understand it as a separate act. In terms of the public perception, Stengel 
commented,
The survivor of a suicidal attempt is regarded . . . as having either bungled his suicide or not 
being sincere in his suicidal intention. . . . It is taken for granted that the sole aim of the genuine 
attempt is self-destruction and therefore the dead are successful and the survivors unsuccessful. 
(Stengel & Cook, 1958, p. 19, emphasis added)
Note the moral judgment that lies behind the emphasized words. Stengel pinpointed how, 
if death alone is to be considered the criterion of “success,” then the surviving self-harmer 
tends to be seen as somehow morally lacking — as insincere or ungenuine in comparison 
to suicide. It is a short step from this judgment to conclude that the self-harmer, in per-
forming the act, harbors ulterior motives of a morally dubious kind. Stengel revealed how 
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the professional perception of self-harm speculates in discriminatory fashion about what 
these “ulterior motives” could be, quoting the work of contemporaries Lewis Siegal and 
Jacob Friedman. “Suicidal threats,” Siegal and Friedman remarked, “pervade our entire 
social structure . . . the threat of suicide forces people to marry, prevents marriage dissolu-
tion . . . forces parents to acquiesce in their offspring’s vicious habits . . . etc.” (Stengel & 
Cook, 1958, p. 119). To these sentiments, Stengel responded, “The authors, by their 
unsympathetic attitude . . . demonstrate that they share the popular belief that an honest, 
i.e. a genuine, suicidal threat . . . has to be dominated by the purpose of self-destruction” 
(p. 119, emphasis added).
Here we fi nd a fi rst criticism of the code. Stengel revealed how the act of weighing up 
self-harm always takes place with the comparison of a “successful” suicide already in mind. 
According to this perspective, if suicide is the genuine article, self-harm must be some sort 
of “fake.” Because of this, the self-harmer is perceived as having not so much “bungled” 
her suicide as, rather, having been insincere in her intention in the fi rst place, in other 
words, as possessing ulterior motives. The act of self-harm thus becomes synonymous with 
a morally negative vocabulary such as ungenuine, dishonest, and so on.
Finally, Stengel exposed the “unsympathetic” attitude of professionals by showing 
how they weighed up those ulterior motives in a discriminatory fashion. Where  Stengel 
detected an “appeal” for human compassion, Siegal and Friedman weighed up those 
ulterior motives as deliberate attempts to manipulate the environment to the benefi t 
of the self-harmer. And it was the morally negative adjectives that accompanied this 
view — insincere, ungenuine, dishonest, manipulative, and so forth — that were to become 
a constant feature of the professional vocabulary of self-harm for some time to come.
The Suicide Act of 1961
Stengel deserves further credit for his legal campaigning in the years prior to the passage 
of the Suicide Act of 1961. Before that date, suicide and its “attempt” had been consid-
ered an “offense” in both juridical and religious terms, punishable in ways that would 
be considered barbaric today (see St. John-Stevas, 1961). In effect, this meant that 
surviving self-harmers, insofar as they were deemed to have “attempted suicide,” could 
be liable to a period of imprisonment. However, with the rise of the medical professions, 
from the 19th century on, a sea change occurred in attitudes to suicide and self-harm 
that became increasingly regarded as medical rather than juridical problems. Because of 
this, a powerful lobby formed comprising the British Medical Association and the Mag-
istrates Association (see British Medical Journal Supplement, 1947), later joined by 
the Church of England (see Church of England Board for Social Responsibility, 1959), 
which campaigned for reform of the law. This was duly enshrined in the Suicide Act, 
which momentously declared, “The rule of law whereby it is a crime for a person to 
 commit suicide is hereby abrogated” (Suicide Act of 1961).
A year later, Stengel observed how this recategorization of “attempted suicide” — from a 
juridical to a medical problem — was swiftly implemented:
The Ministry of Health . . . followed up the passage of the Suicide Act with a circular to hospitals, 
medical practitioners and local authorities “to see that all cases of attempted suicide which come 
to their notice,” receive adequate psychiatric care. Attempted suicide is in future to be regarded as 
entirely a medical and social problem. (Stengel, 1962, p. 204, emphasis added)
[AuQ2]
[AuQ3]
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Like Stengel, we should consider the Suicide Act an example of progressive legislation. 
Yet we need to look beyond this to its signifi cance for medicine’s moral code. To do so is 
to uncover the following:
1.  Despite the fact that the act decriminalized suicide and abolished legal punishment for 
the surviving self-harmer, it nevertheless reinforced the comparison between self-harm and 
suicide. Contributors to parliamentary debates prior to the passage of the act were insistent on 
this point: “The real basis of the measure is that in the humane outlook of today it is recogn-
ised that those who attempt suicide unsuccessfully are in need of compassion . . . not  punishment” 
(Hansard, 1962a, p. 837, emphasis added).
2.  Yet, like Siegal and Friedman before them, both houses of Parliament also suspected some 
self-harmers of ulterior motives. In the debates of 1961, members of Parliament (MPs) and 
peers began to refer to a “gap group” — a group of people who, like Siegal and Friedman’s “sui-
cidal threats,” were considered “ungenuine”: “Among these [the “gap group”] are those who 
may not seriously intend to commit suicide but may want to make a nuisance of themselves” 
(Hansard, 1962b, p. 274, emphasis added).
The problem posed by the “gap group” concerned the issue of their “disposal.” What 
was to be done with them? The Suicide Act rejected the option of “disposal” via the 
criminal justice system. For those considered “genuinely” suicidal, an answer was readily 
found: they would either be so physically injured as to require general hospitalization or 
else considered to be “suffering from a mental disorder” (Hansard, 1961b, p. 250) and 
therefore liable to “detention for 28 days observation” (Hansard, 1961b, p. 250) under 
the provisions of the Mental Health Act of 1959. But the situation was not nearly so 
clear-cut for the gap group. One MP referred to this as the problem of the “people who 
do not fi t” (Hansard, 1961b, p. 1419), and proposals to get them to “fi t” included one or 
more of the following:
• Placing them “on probation”
• A guardianship order on the model of the Children’s and Young Persons Act of 1933
• Imploring “them” (self-harmers) to take “responsibility” for their actions
It is true that the government of the day considered none of these solutions practicable, 
arguing instead that the gap group constituted only a “small minority” of self-harmers. 
However, a subsequent Ministry of Health inquiry (Central Health Services Council, 
1968) — the “Hill” Report — into “Hospital Treatment of Acute Poisoning” noted that the 
“incidence of self-poisoning is now of “epidemic” proportions” (p. 19) and could by no 
means be dealt with by “disposals” of a purely medical kind. The Hill Report concluded 
that the question of “disposal” needed to take into account not only those considered 
“genuinely” suicidal but also the gap group, not just “in-patient psychiatric care” (p. 20) 
but also “ongoing . . . social supervision” (p. 20). Clearly, the government’s theory that the 
gap group was a “small minority” was noticeably wide of the mark.
The Suicide Act and the debates surrounding it develop our knowledge of the code 
signifi cantly. Although self-harm was certainly decriminalized in 1961, this is not the same 
as saying it became less of a moral problem. On the contrary, as Stengel noted, self-harm 
was already incorporated into codes of public and professional morality as much as it was 
in the criminal law. As the Ministry of Health was quick to point out, self-harm was now 
a “medical and social,” no longer a “criminal,” problem. What we witness with regard 
[AuQ4]
[AuQ5]
[AuQ6]
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to self-harm is, therefore, not the disappearance of the moral code that surrounds it but, 
rather, the medicalization of that code.
For this reason, we must temper our opinion of the “progressiveness” of the act. Per-
haps it is preferable to be medicalized rather than criminalized, to be “disposed of ” in 
the psychiatric ward rather than the prison cell. But to this we must add qualifi cations. 
To repeat, from the Suicide Act on, the moral code surrounding self-harm is entirely a 
medical one; its fi elds of application will be medicine and psychiatry. This means that 
the moral judgment surrounding self-harm will no longer be personifi ed by policeman 
and magistrate, no longer embodied in prison and court; from this moment on, the 
A&E nurse and the psychiatrist will police the code. Shall we say that such infl uences 
are purely “progressive,” or shall we say, rather, that they expose self-harm to a code of 
a different kind that, if it does not “punish” in quite the same way, may nevertheless 
remain quick to judge and condemn? In any case, we can now inventory a medical moral 
vocabulary of negative value: the self-harmer is “insincere,” “ungenuine,” “manipulative,” 
 “irresponsible,” a “nuisance,” and so on.
Hence, despite Stengel’s “discovery,” the importance that must still be attached to the 
self-harm–suicide link. True, Stengel had correctly stressed their difference: suicides and 
self-harmers are distinct “populations.” But this observation holds for the psychiatrist in 
his role as a scientist, not in his practice as a moralist. For Siegal and Friedman, as much as 
for MPs and peers of the realm, it was always for its moral value that self-harm was weighed 
up. And if, on one side of the scale, there is a vocabulary of negative value — “insincere,” 
“a nuisance,” and so on — all of which is attached to self-harm, this vocabulary really gains 
its meaning only by comparison with the positive values amassed on the other side of the 
scale. That vocabulary of positive value — “genuine,” “sincere,” and so on — is attached 
only to suicide. This is why if we confi ne ourselves to the “scientifi c” study of self-harm 
and neglect the moral values surrounding the self-harm–suicide link, we will not strike at 
the heart of the code.
Roger Jeffery and the Self-Harmer as “Rubbish”
In any case, though Eric Fletcher, MP, had said of self-harmers that “they are in need of 
compassion . . . not punishment” (Hansard, 1962a, p. 837), we should not automatically 
conclude that “punishment,” which is part and parcel of criminal law, is absent from 
medical practice. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the work of Roger Jeffery, 
a sociologist who studied the treatment of self-harmers in A&E departments in the 
1970s. Jeffery’s (1979) study, “Normal Rubbish: Deviant Patients in Casualty Depart-
ments,” enhances the analysis offered so far by providing insights into the treatment of 
self-harmers in A&E. Jeffery’s method was direct: he physically observed medical prac-
tice in a number of A&E departments and conducted interviews with the doctors and 
nurses working there. The results were startling.
First, Jeffery (1979) endorsed the signifi cance of the self-harm–suicide link for the code, 
noting the comparison that A&E staff drew “between those who really tried to commit 
suicide (for whom there is some respect) and the rest (viewed as immature calls for attention)” 
(p. 100, emphasis added), the latter being associated with what we have referred to as the 
gap group. However, Jeffery also modifi ed our understanding of the self-harm–suicide link 
by incorporating it into a wider comparison that is both a moral and a medical one. This 
comparison is not concerned solely with the question of what it means to be “genuinely” 
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suicidal; it is also concerned with the question of what it means to be “genuinely” ill. 
This question is relevant for A&E staff because, unlike other medical specialties, they 
are obliged to treat “a great variety of patients who present themselves” ( Jeffery, 1979, 
p. 91) at their door. Faced with such variety, Jeffery observed how A&E staff responded by 
 categorizing such patients into two groups: either they were “good patients,” or else they 
were “rubbish” ( Jeffery, 1979, pp. 91–103).
This categorization answers to the following question: what does it take to be counted 
as ill? Jeffery’s answer was that the “good patients” — “head injuries,” “cardiac arrests,” 
“road traffi c accidents” (Jeffery, 1979, p. 92), and the “genuinely” suicidal (pp. 100, 
102) — satisfi ed a number of unwritten “rules” that needed to be followed if a patient wants 
to be “counted as ill.” These rules included the following:
• Not being “responsible” for the presenting “illness” (pp. 99–101)
• Cooperating with staff (pp. 101–103)
• Wanting to “get better” (p. 101)
Just as we noted how the vocabulary of negative value (“insincere,” a “nuisance,” and so 
on) surrounding self-harm gains its meaning by comparison with the positive vocabulary 
of suicide (“genuine,” “sincere,” and so on), so the positive vocabulary of “genuine illness” 
(“cooperative” and so on) gains its meaning by comparison with the negative vocabulary 
of “rubbish.” But who is being classifi ed as “rubbish?” Jeffery is clear that “rubbish” includes 
the self-harmer and that what characterizes such patients is that they fail to obey those 
unwritten “rules.” So, whereas the accident victim is regarded as “not responsible” for 
incurring an injury, the self-harmer, by contrast, “knew what they were doing and chose to 
take an overdose for their own purposes” (p. 100).
Similarly, whereas the “cardiac arrest” wants to “get better,” self-harmers “are seen to 
want to be ill in order to put moral pressure on someone” (Jeffery, 1979, p. 101). Finally, 
instead of actively cooperating with treatment, “overdoses fi ght back when a rubber tube 
is . . . forced down their throats so that their stomachs can be washed out” (pp. 101–102, 
emphasis added).
Second, the latter example raises again the issue of “punishment.” Clearly, to have a 
rubber tube “forced down” one’s throat and “being held down and sat upon” (Jeffery, 1979, 
p. 103) during the course of that “treatment” would amount, in a nonmedical setting, to a 
form of assault. Jeffery correctly called this “punishment” (pp. 103–104) and explained it 
in terms of the “frustration” staff felt faced with patients who resisted the “rules” (p. 100). 
“Rubbish” patients, Jeffery remarked, were “liable to punishment” (p. 104), and this con-
sisted of both “verbal hostility” and physical “restraint” (p. 103). Criminal “punishment,” 
it seemed, had not, as Eric Fletcher had hoped, been replaced with medical “compas-
sion” by the Suicide Act. Rather, the medicalization of the code surrounding self-harm 
remained compatible with “punishment” but of a specifi cally medical kind.
Jeffery wrote in 1979 at a time when, although there was some awareness of the code, 
there was no collective resistance to it by patients themselves. By “collective resistance,” we 
are referring to the type of political activism associated with “protest movements,” such 
as feminism, gay liberation, black power, and antipsychiatry (see Crossley, 2002). Such 
movements fought against their oppression and for their human rights; they sought a 
“voice” where previously they had been silenced. But in 1979, the “voice” of the self-
harmer had yet to be heard. However critical his stance, it is worth recalling that Jeffery 
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had interviewed only the staff in A&E, not the patients. Similarly, though Stengel did 
interview patients, he saw himself primarily as an “expert” on their experience, not the 
patients’ “ally.” But the time was approaching when self-harmers would start to speak for 
their own experience and resist medicine’s moral code. It is to that “resistance” that we 
turn in the second half of this article.
PSYCHIATRIC SURVIVORS AND HARM 
MINIMIZATION, 1988–2000
The rise of the psychiatric survivor movement has been depicted elsewhere, and there is 
no space to repeat it here (see Crossley, 2006; Cresswell, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). Self-harm 
survivors, as a subset of the psychiatric survivor movement, make up a network of individ-
ual activists and groups who have committed acts of self-harm that have brought them into 
contact with medical services. Self-harm survivors have protested about the “treatment” 
they have received and have tried to reform services to make them more sensitive to their 
life experiences, including their actual experiences of using those services (see Pembroke, 
1994). The previous section on the development of medicine’s moral code in the post–
World War II period historically supports the validity of the survivor perspective.
The self-harm survivor movement has its roots in a combination of mental health and 
feminist activism, which fl owered in England in the mid- to late 1980s and was particu-
larly concerned to raise awareness about women’s experience of sexism, self-harm, and 
service provision (see Harrison, 1995; Ross, 1988). However, activists were also aware of 
and spoke out about men’s experience of self-harm and their “treatment” (see Smith, as 
cited in Pembroke, 1994, p. 18; Dace & Smith, 1998).
The movement achieved some important historical milestones in this period:
•  The establishment of the Bristol Crisis Service for Women (BCSW) in 1988, the fi rst 
 campaigning organization to raise social awareness about the needs and “treatment” of self-
harmers (see Wilton, 1995)
•  The “Looking at Self-Harm” conference of 1989, the fi rst event ever held on self-harm that 
was entirely organized by the survivor movement (Asylum, 1989, p. 16), bringing together 
key activists from BCSW with “psychiatric survivors” from the London-based organization 
“Survivors Speak Out”
•  The formation of the NSHN in 1995, the fi rst national campaigning body focused upon self-
harm and led by “survivors” (see Pembroke, 1995)
These achievements are milestones; they transform our understanding of medicine’s moral 
code in the latter part of the 20th century. What is only hinted at in Stengel and Jeffery 
becomes fully exposed in the work of survivors. If Stengel and Jeffery provide clues to 
detect the code, survivors also demand that its discriminatory effects be addressed. At the 
same time, survivors’ own suggestions for alternative practices (e.g., harm minimization) 
remain of signifi cance today.
Consider, for example, the issue of “punishment.” Jeffery had certainly observed this, 
if somewhat dispassionately. The speeches at the “Looking at Self-Harm” conference, by 
contrast, were far more explicit. Andy Smith referred to “outright physical abuse” (in 
Pembroke, 1994, p. 17) suffered in A&E in the form of “inadequate anesthesia” during 
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the stitching of self-infl icted wounds. Louise Pembroke (1994) called such treatment 
“common” (p. 3) and, echoing Jeffery’s observations, but this time from personal experi-
ence, testifi ed to the punishments meted out for self-poisoning too:
She [a nurse] . . . informed me that I would be given a “Gastric Lavage.” . . . Several pairs of hands 
pinned me to the trolley whilst the treatment was carried out . . . . As the doctor took blood 
I screamed. (p. 32)
Yet it would be wrong to regard punishment alone as defi ning the code. For what made 
such practices possible, what provides for their ongoing justifi cation, is a discriminatory 
attitude expressed in a vocabulary of negative value, which weighs up self-harm. This 
vocabulary arises because self-harm is negatively valued in comparison with the “genu-
inely suicidal” (Stengel), the “genuinely ill” (Jeffery), or, in the overall sense of the 
“good patient” (Jeffery), both. All this survivors surmised from their direct experience 
of “treatment.”
The remainder of the article tracks survivor activism as it relates to the attributes — 
punishments, attitudes, vocabularies — that make up the code. This will complete the 
tasks set out at the article’s start and, further, will show that such activism leads not just 
to criticisms of the code, in the style of Stengel and Jeffery, but also to a reevaluation of 
self-harm itself. Self-harm, survivors will show, is possessed of positive value.
Suicide
Survivors appeared to endorse Stengel’s distinction between self-harm and suicide. As 
Louise Pembroke (1994) observed, “There are two distinct types of self-harm: Firstly, self-
harm with suicidal intent. . . . Secondly, self-harm without suicidal intent” (p. 2).
But in this they owed Stengel no debt. In fact, survivors’ radicalism may be defi ned not 
only in terms of a distinction to be drawn between self-harm and suicide but also in terms 
of a connection. Stengel saw the two as distinct populations, useful for purposes of scientifi c 
research; he always conceded that some self-harmers might go onto commit suicide, and he 
was interested in such questions as “Who?” and “Why?” In that sense, though the majority 
of self-harmers do not commit suicide, self-harm could be considered what today would be 
called a “risk factor.” For Stengel, this was a scientifi c issue concerning questions of cause 
and effect and in no way detracted from his opinion that it was clinically wrong to nega-
tively value self-harm in comparison to suicide in the manner of, say, Siegal and Friedman.
Stengel’s opinion remains valid as a criticism of the code. But survivors went further 
than this. They saw that discrimination produced by the code could have such devastat-
ing effects on the survivor that the code itself, rather than self-harm, was a risk factor for 
suicide. This effect of the code has often been noted: “It is poor responses from mental 
health service and A&E that culminate in such loss of self-worth that people are driven 
to commit suicide” (Pembroke, 2002a, p. 18, emphasis added; see also Diane Harrison, in 
Pembroke, 1994, p. 7).
This constituted a more radical challenge to the code than Stengel’s criticisms. For, when 
the code negatively valued self-harm in comparison with suicide, survivors responded by 
inserting the code as an intermediary between the self-harm – suicide link — as itself a risk 
factor for suicide. The connection is profound and, in a sense, identifi es the ultimate pun-
ishment deployed by the code. It is a connection all too tragically derived from experience 
itself.
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And it was “from experience itself  ” that survivors arrived at a focus on “self-harm 
 without suicidal intent” (Pembroke, 1994, p. 2). This took the distinction between self-
harm and suicide as established apart from the radical challenge sketched out previously. 
Generally, survivors were as concerned with resisting the comparison with the wider 
 category of the “good patient” that negatively valued them and was such a discriminatory 
feature of service provision.
The “Good Patient”
The key to understanding this comparison is the very idea of deliberateness at the heart of 
the category “deliberate self-harm” (DSH). The adjective “deliberate” in DSH is one that 
survivors resisted. Louise Pembroke (1994) expressed it like this: “Self-harm . . . does not 
require qualifying with ‘Deliberate’ ” (p. 3).
Why not? There are two reasons and they strike at the heart of the code.
First, because, as psychiatrists would surely admit, the point of the “deliberate” in “delib-
erate self-harm” is precisely to establish a comparison between the self-harmer and accident 
victim — to the former’s detriment. This is apparent even from medical defi nitions, such as 
that of Gethin Morgan (1979), who coined the term (DSH) as “a deliberate non-fatal act, 
whether physical . . . or poisoning, done in the knowledge that it was potentially harmful” 
(p. 88, emphasis added).
That sounds “objective” — until it is inserted into the negative vocabulary of the 
code. As Jeffery (1979) observed, “rubbish” is compared with the “good patient” exactly 
to the extent that the self-harmer had prior “knowledge” of the harm they would cause: 
“[the self-harmer] knew what they were doing and chose to take an overdose for their 
own purposes” (p. 100, emphasis added).
The discriminatory effects of the use of “deliberateness” have been inventoried by sur-
vivors. Diane Harrison, a founder member of BCSW, observed, “I cut my throat and had 
to go into hospital. The nurses were really kind to me until they found out that my injury 
was self-infl icted” (in Ross, 1988, p. 45, emphasis added). In “Looking at Self-Harm,” Andy 
Smith pinpointed the consequences of being treated as someone who, in knowing “what 
they were doing,” had failed to “play the game” by the “rules”:
The staff attitude . . . was one of deterrence. . . . “ The element of humiliation could consist of being 
told that any discomfort I might be feeling from the festering week old wound . . . was invalid 
because there were people there who were injured by accident.” (Smith, as cited in Pembroke, 1994, 
p. 17, emphasis added)
Second, because the notion of DSH, divorced from Morgan’s medical defi nition, has a 
wider meaning than medicine itself allows. Here we witness an important innovation of 
“self-harm survivors”: to have not only resisted the defi nition DSH, in its narrow medical 
sense, but to have expanded it in the wider sense of a continuum of nonfatal self-harming 
behaviors. This expansion has elsewhere been called the continuum concept (see Cresswell, 
2005a).
What is this “continuum?” At the heart of medicine’s moral code are discrimina-
tory practices that devalue self-harm in relation to comparatively valued behaviors: 
suicide, accident, and illness. The code isolates DSH and surrounds it with negative 
value. The thrust of survivors “continuum concept” is to resist this isolation and stress, 
instead, the common-ground shared by nonfatal self-harming behaviors. Obviously, this 
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 common ground does not include suicide, but it does include a wider range of self-
harm than DSH permits. This continuum includes behaviors that are already captured 
by medical  categories, as Maggy Ross of BCSW described at “Looking at Self-Harm”: 
“there are many ways of self-injuring — cutting up is just one. Anorexia and Bulimia 
are others. So’s alcohol and drug abuse. Not to mention hitting things, burning and 
scalding oneself, or swallowing non-ingestants like bleach” (in Pembroke, 1994, p. 14, 
emphasis added).
At fi rst sight, establishing the continuum like this may not seem to resist the discrimi-
natory effects of the code; after all, do not anorexia, drug and alcohol abuse, and so on 
fall victim to moral codes of their own — codes that share certain features with that sur-
rounding self-harm? Jeffery (1979), recall, noted that self-harmers were classifi ed not only 
as “rubbish” in A&E but as “tramps” and “drunks” as well (pp. 96–98). However, the 
continuum proposed by survivors stretches wider than this, for it includes not only what 
Tamsin Wilton — also of BCSW — called “not socially acceptable” acts of self-harm (e.g., 
Maggy Ross’s list) but “socially acceptable” acts as well (see Wilton, 1995, p. 36; see also 
Pembroke, 1994, p. 2). The list of the latter, as Louise Pembroke noted, is large, including 
the following:
• Liposuction
• Bikini-line waxing
• Wearing high heels
• Dieting
• Body piercing
• Excessive exercise
• Smoking
• Drinking
The continuum concept featured strongly in the work of the NSHN between 1995 and 
the turn of the millennium. In their 1998 publication The “Hurt Yourself Less” Work-
book, the scope of the continuum was emphasized:
[By] self-harm we mean any activity that you do to yourself that is not kind or hurts yourself. For many 
people this is cutting, burning, overdosing, alcohol. . . .You may fi nd you have your own self-harm 
continuum. (NSHN, 1998, p. 30, emphasis added)
Louise Pembroke (1999) later summed up the meaning succinctly: “self-harm is a con-
tinuum and we are all on it” (p. 39, emphasis added). The emphasis (“all”) matters here 
because it sums up the way in which the continuum concept resists the code. By stress-
ing the universality of self-harm (“we are all on” the continuum), the NSHN uncovered 
an aspect of the code that Stengel and Jeffery only dimly discerned: essentially, it is a 
form of discrimination directed against the self-harmer by the public and  professionals 
alike. It is precisely in this sense that the category DSH isolates the self-harmer in 
comparison with the “good patient” but also in comparison with the professional. In 
other words, the vocabulary of negative value surrounds only the self-harmer; it does 
not surround the good patient or the professional. Yet, by stressing the universality of 
the self-harm continuum, survivors resisted that assumption of superiority that those 
that police the code claim to possess. In a sense, survivors imply that we are all self-
harmers now.
[AuQ7]
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That recognition has a surprising effect. If “we are all self-harmers now,” two pos-
sibilities follow: either (a) we are all subject to the vocabulary of negative value — the 
drinker, smoker, body piercer, and so on now all fall victim to the “insults” that the 
self-harmer has for so long endured — or (b) we shall have to suspend the vocabulary 
of negative value and revalue self-harm. In stressing this second possibility, “survivors” 
pursued a tradition that began with the feminist practice of asserting the positive aspects 
of “self-destructive” behaviors. Susie Orbach (1986), for instance, had revalued “eating 
disorders” in exactly this way: “feminism has taught. . .that activities that appear to be 
self-destructive are invariably adaptations, attempts to cope with the world” (p. 11, emphasis 
added).
In other words, viewed as “attempts to cope with the world,” anorexia / bulimia may be 
possessed of positive value. Survivors, however, radicalized Orbach by extending the range 
of revalued behaviors while simultaneously resisting the claims to superiority of the pro-
fessionals. Provocatively, when conducting training events for professionals — a frequent 
aspect of survivor activism during this period — they (the professionals) were encouraged 
to “explore their own self-harm” (Pembroke, 1994, p. 56, emphasis added). Such activism 
resists the code by undermining that claim of superiority that permits the professional to 
isolate and then discriminate against the self-harmer.
It would be a mistake, though, in surveying survivor activism to conclude that they were 
irretrievably hostile toward service providers or that, in seeking to revalue self-harm, they 
in fact celebrated it. Unlike some traditions of mental health  activism, self-harm survivors 
consistently sought dialogue with professionals and in seeking the constructive reform 
of service provision supported aspects of the welfare state such as emergency medicine. 
Politically, survivors developed a network of alliances that included psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, general practitioners, psychiatric and general nurses, plastic surgeons, and the 
British Red Cross (see Cresswell, 2005b). The activism of NSHN is a model of such 
“networking”: both publications of the period 1995–2000 were provided with forewords 
by prestigious professionals (Barker, 2000; Thomas, 1998), while the “Risk Reduction” 
conferences of 1999 included contributions from the British Red Cross, a plastic surgeon, 
nurses, and medical students (see Pembroke, 2007).
Occasionally, survivors are characterized as condoning or even celebrating self-harm. 
That is a myth. One searches in vain in their activism for even a hint of the idea that 
self-harm is considered either a lifestyle choice or a subcultural category. In fact, as with 
Orbach’s recognition of anorexia / bulimia as a “painful” activity, survivors’ personal narra-
tives testify that self-harm is a complex phenomenon that emerges to cope with distress 
and is often related to trauma (see Cresswell, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; see also LeFevre, 1996). 
What survivors did insist on was the discriminatory effects of the code and the need to 
revalue self-harm as a “painful” way to “cope with the world.” Diane Harrison (1995) 
summed up their position with clarity: “I have been accused of “celebrating self-harm. . . . 
While I do not celebrate self-harm itself, I do celebrate women’s resourcefulness in impos-
sible situations” (p. 72).
One question emerging from the previous discussion is the following: in resisting medi-
cine’s moral code, do survivors argue that no aspect of that code is appropriately applied 
to self-harm? The question requires careful addressing because insofar as the code is a 
discriminatory code, the opposition to it must be “lock, stock, and barrel.” On the other 
hand, though the code wields moral categories in a discriminatory fashion, it does not 
 follow from this that all are discriminatory in quite the same way.
[AuQ8]
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It is not a question here of detecting traces of validity in such discriminatory 
 categories as “rubbish,” “attention seeking,” “a nuisance,” and so on. There are none 
to be found. But in recalling that self-harmers were called “irresponsible” and simulta-
neously implored to “take responsibility” for their actions, it is worth refl ecting on the 
category of “responsibility” being here invoked. In fact, survivors did accept that the 
moral category of  “responsibility” may be appropriately applied to self-harm and, more-
over, that they themselves should apply it. Indeed, the NSHN’s reworking of the way 
in which a code of “responsibility” did apply to self-harm is closely connected to a 
practice that was to become central to their activism in the period in question: harm 
minimization.
The article closes with a brief account of that practice. We shall see that in reworking a 
moral category deployed in a discriminatory code, “survivors” resisted that code by deploy-
ing an alternative code of their own.
HARM MINIMIZATION
Harm minimization cannot be separated from the expanded defi nition of the “continuum 
concept” sketched out previously; that is precisely the context in which the category of 
“responsibility” gets reworked. Just as the continuum concept of self-harming behaviors 
stressed its universality (“we are all on it”), so responsibility should, survivors argued, be 
universally applied across the continuum. This reworking strategy was summarized like 
this:
Self-harm is a continuum and we are all on it. . . . We . . . all have a responsibility to limit the effects 
of our distress and self-harm on others. Stopping doesn’t have to be a goal; rather the goal is 
managing it and fi nding the least damaging option. (Louise Pembroke, in Fursland, 1999, p. 39, 
emphasis added)
Again, by stressing that responsibility applies across the continuum (smoking, drinking, 
and so on), survivors undermined that sense of professional superiority that enabled the 
code to isolate them in the fi rst place. Once that is resisted, a path opens up to con-
sider the specifi c form that responsibility takes when applied to self-injury/poisoning. This 
reworking of the responsibility issue was not a sudden discovery; it emerged from collec-
tive refl ections that may be traced back to BCSW (see Ross, 1988) and the “Looking at 
Self-Harm” conference, culminating in the activism of the NSHN. The key innovation 
was to link responsibility, not to “stopping” self-harm as the code demands but, instead, 
as Pembroke stated, to the “least damaging option.” This is the meaning at the heart of 
harm minimization. The least damaging option was addressed by Andy Smith under the 
heading of “the role of the safety kit in clipping the cycle” (in Pembroke, 1994, p. 19), 
and his account is worth stating at length:
The role of professionals in my ceasing to self-harm is negligible . . . an integral part of the damage 
was the vilifi cation by the Accident & Emergency staff, so I would carry a safety kit consisting of: 
a clean sterile blade with which to cut myself, a tube of antiseptic cream, cotton wool, Butterfl y 
steri-strips, plasters and a Crepe bandage. With this I could successfully limit the damage to myself, 
my self-esteem and my reputation. (emphasis added)
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Such advice was developed further by the NSHN and formed the centerpiece of their 
milestones of activism in the period 1998–2000: The “Hurt Yourself Less” Workbook (1998), 
the “Risk Reduction Conferences” of 1999, and Cutting the Risk: Self-Harm, Self-Care and 
Risk Reduction (2000). One example demonstrates the infl uence of this activism. In Pem-
broke’s introduction to Cutting the Risk in 2000, she outlined the benefi ts members of the 
NSHN had derived from harm minimization:
Some members . . . actively choose not to seek treatment, and carry clean blades and a fi rst-aid kit. 
This has enabled some to feel in greater control over their self-injury. It’s about choice and mini-
mising risks whilst we live with self-harm. Facing the practical reality of looking after ourselves. 
(NSHN, 2000, p. 5, emphasis added)
Harm minimization remains a controversial practice, though there is also evidence of 
acceptance among some service providers today.1 The controversy arises because the 
code interprets the responsibility appropriate to self-harm to mean exactly the same as 
stopping self-harm. If the self-harmer is not suicidal, is neither “genuinely” ill nor had 
an accident, the code weighs her up as irresponsible; it follows, then, that to become 
responsible, she has to stop the self-harm — hence the professional obsession, from 
the 1980s on, of seeking a “contract” with the self-harmer, the chief clause of which 
would be her agreement not to self-harm (see Bloom & Rosenbluth, 1989; O’Brien, 
Caldwell, & Transeau, 1985). This “contractual” approach to policing the code was, as 
Sharon LeFevre demonstrated, not really an “agreement” at all; it was a form of “bully-
ing” (see LeFevre, 1996, p. 45).
Yet, once considered from the survivor perspective, harm minimization seems entirely 
pragmatic — a point survivors have frequently stressed:
Self-harm is a survival strategy . . . the only way to get them to reduce the harm . . . or stop . . . is 
through acceptance and engagement, working with their behaviour while learning about it. This 
requires the adoption of a pragmatic approach to maximise the client’s safety while he or she 
continue to self-harm. (Pembroke, 1998c, p. 38, emphasis added)
We should note that this “pragmatic” approach included recognition of its own limita-
tions; that is, harm minimization is a self-critical code rather than, like medicine’s code, 
an ideological dogma. For instance, while the NSHN provided advice for the self-harmer 
caught in a pattern of self-injury (e.g., “cutting”), they were scrupulously “responsible” in 
refusing to extend this advice to the self-poisoner — precisely on account of the fact that, in 
the case of an overdose, there was no practical way to fi nd the “least damaging option”: 
“we were very clear that harm-minimisation principles did not apply to any internal damage 
such as overdoses because internal damage cannot be seen nor assessed except by medical 
testing at hospital” (Pembroke, 2007).
This quotation is a prime example of how survivors’ alternative code resisted med-
icine’s moral code while providing a refl ective account of “responsible” and “safe” 
 self-harm: it could be responsible for self-injurers to practice harm minimization — The 
“Hurt Yourself Less” Workbook and Cutting the Risk showed them how — but such 
“responsibility” could not apply to the overdoser who, to act “responsibly,” had to 
practice either “safer” self-harm or else enlist immediate medical help (see NSHN, 
2000, pp. 6–7).
[AuQ9]
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CONCLUSION
With these notes on responsibility in mind, it is time to sum up the challenge posed to the 
code by the alternative code of survivors. That challenge is this:
1.  Medicine’s moral code, it has to be emphasized, is a discriminatory code. The task for profes-
sionals remains to confront the challenge to service provision that this realization invites. In 
other words, they have a “responsibility” too. True, Stengel and Jeffery fi rst detected the code, 
but it was only self-harm survivors who, moving beyond the level of criticism, demanded 
reform. They thus initiated what has since become known as a “politics of self-harm” (Span-
dler & Warner, 2007). Yet it is necessary to recognize that harm minimization, together with 
the reworking of responsibility that it entails, arose precisely because of the experience of 
discrimination, especially in A&E. This is why harm minimization must be considered fi rst 
and foremost a productive resistance to power — a relation about which self-harm survivors 
were always abundantly clear. Those who continue to fi nd harm minimization controversial 
should perhaps refl ect that this alternative code did not appear in a vacuum; its origins are in 
resistance to the “poor practice” (Pembroke, 2002b, p. 20) of the code itself. Perhaps, as some 
professionals are beginning to realize, this recognition introduces a positive prospect — that of 
a democratic reworking of the category of “responsible” professional care and, hence, of a true 
dialogue between givers and receivers of care.
2.  Finally, what follows from this recognition is that such dialogue may only be based on 
resistance to medicine’s moral code. As this article has shown, that code does not concern 
“punishment” solely but also a complex of discriminatory attitudes that weigh up self-harm. 
It seems, then, that a “true dialogue” — which is to say, a democratic dialogue — has to be 
based on a newly responsible code, one that redefi nes the relation between self-harm and 
moral value — on a code, in other words, that will not stack up all its positive terms on just 
one side of the scale (in favor of suicide, accident, and illness) and then all its negative 
terms just on the side of self-harm. Where moral values and self-harm are concerned, we 
need to rebalance the scale.
This is not, to repeat, a case of celebrating self-harm. It is a case of conceding a sphere of posi-
tive value. The alternative is to regard it only negatively, as Gillian Mezey regarded it in the 
opening quote of this article, with revulsion. Of course, as we have seen, “revulsion” turns out 
to be just one entry in a long list of entries in a vocabulary of negative value. But to revalue 
self-harm is to truly embrace that responsibility that is part and parcel of dialogue — to 
accept it, as Louise Pembroke (1994) did, as “a painful but understandable response to 
distress. . . . [It] is about . . . self-preservation . . . and coping with the uncopeable” (p. 1).
Self-harm, it turns out, is not so much about a fact as a value.
NOTE
1. The Royal College of Nursing’s Annual Congress 2006 discussed the issue, asking “Safe Self-
Harm — Is It Possible?” and, though raising concerns about professional accountability and ethics, 
also showed some sensitivity to the views of survivors (see the conference report at http://www.
rcn.org.uk/downloads/congress2006/reports_agenda.pdfch — consulted 14/09/07). The whole issue 
of the ethical and legal aspects surrounding harm minimization is the subject of a forthcoming DVD 
from the survivor-led National Self-Harm Minimisation Group, Cutting the Risk, which features 
contributions from prominent survivors, academics, professionals, and legal experts.
3072-252-009.indd   173 6/11/2010   7:38:09 AM
174 Cresswell and Karimova
S—
E—
L—
REFERENCES
Asylum. (1989). Survivors news. Asylum: A Magazine for Democratic Psychiatry, 4(1), 16.
Barker, P. (2000). Foreword. In Cutting the risk: Self-harm, self-care and risk reduction (pp. 1–4). 
London: National Self-Harm Network.
Bloom, H., & Rosenbluth, M. (1989). The use of contracts in the inpatient treatment of the bor-
derline personality disorder. Psychiatric Quarterly, 60(4), 317–327.
Central Health Services Council. (1968). Hospital treatment of acute poisoning: Report of the joint sub-
committee of the standing medical advisory committees. London: HMSO.
Church, K. (1996) Forbidden narratives: Critical autobiography as social science. London: Routledge.
Church of England Board for Social Responsibility. (1959). Ought suicide to be a crime? Westminster: 
Church Information Offi ce.
Cresswell, M. (2005a). Psychiatric “survivors” and testimonies of self-harm. Social Science and Medi-
cine, 61, 1668–1677.
Cresswell, M. (2005b). Self-harm “survivors” and psychiatry in England, 1988–1996. Social Theory 
and Health, 3, 259–285.
Cresswell, M. (2007). Self-harm and the politics of experience. Journal of Critical Psychology, Coun-
seling and Psychotherapy, 7(1), 9–17.
Cresswell, M., & Spandler, S. (2009). Psychopolitics: Peter Sedgwick’s legacy for the politics of 
mental health. Social Theory and Health, 7(2): 129–147.
Crossley, N. (2002). Making sense of social movements. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Crossley, N. (2006). Contesting psychiatry. London: Routledge.
Dace, E., & Smith, A. (1998). Holding the hurt. Mental Health Care, 2(2), 54.
Farberow, N., & Schneidman, E. (Eds.). (1961). The cry for help. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Fursland, E. (1999). Face to face: A dialogue between Ray Rowden & Louise Pembroke. Nursing 
Times, 95(1), 38–39.
Hanson, M. (1988, June 28). Letting out the big scream inside. The Guardian.
Harrison, D. (1995). Vicious circles: An exploration of women and self-harm in society. London: Good 
Practices in Mental Health Publication.
Herman, J. (1992). Trauma and recovery. New York: Basic Books.
Jeffery, R. (1979). Normal rubbish: Deviant patients in casualty departments. Sociology of Health and 
Illness, 1(1), 90–108.
LeFevre, S. (1996). Killing me softly: Self-harm, survival not suicide. Gwynedd: Handsell Publica-
tions.
Morgan, H. G. (1979). Death wishes: The understanding and management of deliberate self-harm. 
Chichester: Wiley.
National Self-Harm Network. (1998). The “hurt yourself-less” workbook. London: Author.
National Self-Harm Network. (2000). Cutting the risk: Self-harm, self-care and risk reduction. London: 
Author.
O’Brien, P., Caldwell, C., & Transeau, G. (1985). Destroyers: Written treatment contracts can help 
cure self destructive behaviors of the borderline patient. Journal of Psychosocial Nursing and 
Mental Health Services, 23(4), 19–23.
Orbach, S. (1986). Fat is a feminist issue: How to lose weight permanently without dieting. London: 
Arrow Books.
Pembroke, L. (Ed.). (1994). Self-harm: Perspectives from personal experience. London: Survivors Speak 
Out.
Pembroke, L. (1995). National self-harm network. Openmind, 73, 13.
Pembroke, L. (1998). Only scratching the surface. Nursing Times, 94(27), 38–39.
Pembroke, L. (2002a). Allowing some self-harm is common sense. Nursing Times, 98(1), 18.
Pembroke, L. (2002b). A&E staff give self-harmers good care. Nursing Times, 98(34), 20.
Ross, M. (1988). Shocking habit. The Company, 44–46.
[AuQ11]
[AuQ12]
3072-252-009.indd   174 6/11/2010   7:38:09 AM
Self-Harm and Medicine’s Moral Code 175
—S
—E
—L
Shaw, C. (2005) Woman at the margins: Me, borderline personality disorder and women at the 
margins. Annual Review of Critical Psychology, 4, 124–136.
Spandler, H. (1996). Who’s hurting who? Young people, self-harm and suicide. Manchester: 42nd Street.
Spandler, H., & Warner, S. (2007). Beyond fear and control: Working with young people who self-harm. 
Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books.
Stengel, E., & Cook, N. (1958). Attempted suicide: Its social signifi cance and effects. London: Oxford 
University Press.
Stengel, E. (1962). The National Health Service and the suicide problem. In P. Halmos (Ed.), Soci-
ology Review monograph. Staffordshire: University of Keele.
Stengel, E. (1964). Suicide and attempted suicide. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
St. John-Stevas, N. (1961). Life, death and the law: A study of the relationship between law and Christian 
morals in the English and American legal systems. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.
Thomas, P. (1998). Foreword. In The “hurt yourself-less” workbook (pp. 3–6). London: National Self 
Harm Network.
Wilton, T. (1995). Madness and feminism: Bristol Crisis Service for Women. In G. Griffi n (Ed.). 
Feminist activism in the 1990’s. London: Taylor & Francis.
Mark Cresswell, PhD, teaches sociology within the School of Applied Social Sciences at Durham 
University, United Kingdom. A former psychiatric nurse and trade union organizer, he has been 
active in the mental health user movement and has been chair of both Survivors (Sheffi eld) and 
the National Self-Harm Minimisation Group. He researches and writes on the history and politics 
of psychiatry, and much of his work is now archived with the Survivors History Group (http://
studymore.org.uk/7.htm#MarkCresswell)
Zulfi a Karimova, PhD, holds doctorates from both Moscow State University and the University 
of Manchester. She has taught sociology at Manchester and at the universities of Northumbria 
and Teesside. She researches and writes on the history and politics of mental health, Russian 
nationalism, and the culture of her country of birth, Bashkortostan.
Correspondence regarding this article should be directed to Mark Cresswell, PhD, School of Applied 
Social Studies, 32 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN, UK. E-mail: mark.cresswell@durham.ac.uk
[AuQ13]
[AuQ14]
[AuQ15]
3072-252-009.indd   175 6/11/2010   7:38:09 AM
 [AuQ1] Please provide 4 to 6 keywords for article.
 [AuQ2]  Author: Please add British Medical Journal Supplement 1947 to the Refer-
ences.
 [AuQ3]  Author: In the extracted quote after the Section “Suicide Act of 1961,” please 
supply the missing closing quotation mark.
 [AuQ4] Author: Please add Hansard 1962a to the References.
 [AuQ5] Author: Please add Hansard 1962b to the References.
 [AuQ6] Author: Please add Hansard 1961b to the References.
 [AuQ7] Author: Please add Pembroke 1999 to the References.
 [AuQ8] Author: Please add Pembroke 2007 to the References.
 [AuQ9] Author: Please add Pembroke 1998c to the References.
[AuQ10]  Author: In the second-to-last paragraph before “Conclusion,” please supply 
page number for the Pembroke quote.
[AuQ11] Author: In the References, please supply page numbers for Hanson.
[AuQ12]  Author: In the References, please add Pembroke 1998 to the text or delete 
here.
[AuQ13]  Author: In the References, please add Spandler 1996 to the text or delete 
here.
[AuQ14] Author: In the References, please supply page numbers for Stengel 1962.
[AuQ15] Author: In the References, please supply page numbers for Wilton.
3072-252-009.indd   176 6/11/2010   7:38:09 AM
